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  In this paper we review and extend some of the key lessons that seem to 
be emerging from the Ramsey-inspired theory of dynamic optimal monetary 
and fiscal policies. We construct measures of the key distortions in our 
economy; we label these ‘dynamic wedges’. Inflation, actual or anticipated, 
distorts these wedges in the present period, it shrinks the tax base and increases 
the deadlweight loss. We show that, if possible, labour as well as capital ought 
to be subsidized in steady state. We point to a number of extensions to the 
Ramsey literature that may help in the formulation of actual policy. 
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www.st-and.ac.uk/cdma 1. Introduction
In this paper we want to oﬀer a selective review, and extension, of some of the
key results emerging from the literature on the conduct of optimal monetary
and ﬁscal policy in a closed economy when nominal prices are sticky, taxes are
distortionary and the debt instruments available to the government are limited
to nominal period debt. Due to space considerations, we shall largely set to one
side the issue of commitment. However, by way of indication where, in our view,
the literature needs to go, we shall extend the framework normally encountered
in the literature in three principle directions. First, in a sticky price environment,
we shall model capital accumulation endogenously. Second, we shall incorporate
taxation on savings as well as on labour income. Third, we construct what we call
‘dynamic wedges’. These are useful summary statistics which reﬂect how some of
the model economy’s key distortions evolve through time; it is these distortions
that a Ramsey strategy for optimal policy must, in some sense, address. We argue
that these wedges imply that there are reasons for believing that price stability is
likely to be a key pillar in any optimal monetary-ﬁscal programme.
2. A brief overview of the literature
For much of the post-war period monetary and ﬁscal policy were analysed
in aggregative macroeconomic models of the IS-LM variety and there was
little attempt to understand policy from a welfare maximising perspective;
that development had to wait until after the advent of micro-founded general
equilibrium macro-models which took root in the 1970s. However, there were
some early forays attempting to infer optimal monetary policy by understanding
the microeconomic distortions caused by inﬂation. Three key papers stand out;
Bailey (1956), Friedman, (1969) and Phelps (1973). For reasons of space, we
2shall brieﬂy discuss only the latter two. Friedman argued that if the marginal
social cost of supplying money was approximately zero, then to attain an eﬃcient
outcome, the private marginal cost of holding money should also be zero. As the
private marginal cost is the nominal interest rate, it follows that this should be
approximately zero. And since the nominal interest rate is equal to the sum of
the real rate and (expected) inﬂation, inﬂation should be roughly equal to the
negative of the real interest rate: The Friedman Rule concludes that a policy of
deﬂation is optimal from a welfare point of view. Phelps (1973), on the other hand,
argues that since governments need to raise revenue to fund their expenditure they
should optimally draw on all tax sources. The money base (seigniorage) is one
such source and so welfare maximising inﬂation ought to be positive. Walsh (2003)
and Chari and Kehoe (1999) are insightful guides as to how that particular debate
played out, but these contributions demonstrate that what distortions exits in the
economy will determine what optimal policy should look like. When we come to
consider models with sticky prices that issue will prove to be very important.
As regards ﬁscal policy, Barro (1979) argued that if changing taxes is costly,
then taxes (tax rates) should be smoothed through time; sharp swings in tax
rates to balance the government’s budget each period would be very costly and
governments should issue debt in order smooth taxes (i.e., spread the distortion
through time).
2.1. Ramsey approach to optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy
Lucas and Stokey (1983) provided the ﬁr s ta t t e m p tt oc h a r a c t e r i s eo p t i m a l
macroeconomic policy in a single coherent framework by applying the Ramsey
(1927) principle to optimal dynamic monetary and ﬁscal policy. They analysed
an economy in which unavoidable (stochastic) government expenditure had to be
ﬁnanced out of distortionary taxation. Assuming an environment of complete
3contingent markets for government debt they came to a number of landmark
conclusions. First, tax rates should follow the same stochastic processes as the
shocks driving the economy. Second, tax rates should be smoothed over time
and across states of nature. Third, state contingent debt would facilitate the
smoothing of taxes across states and, under some circumstances, would render
optimal policy time consistent. Fourth, the Friedman Rule is optimal; the nominal
interest rate should be zero, and period by period agents in the economy should
anticipate deﬂation.
For present purposes, two major extensions to the analysis of Lucas and Stokey
(1983) need to be highlighted. First, what happens when debt instruments are
limited to one-period nominal debt, a step in the direction of realism? In that case,
all else equal, the ﬁscal authority will be motivated to try to make the nominal
period debt stock behave in a manner as close as possible to a full state-contingent
stock. For example, when an adverse shock comes along the only way taxes can
be smoothed is for some (perhaps all) of the debt stock to be repudiated (inﬂated
away). However the implication of these results, i.e., of smooth tax rates but
potentially very volatile inﬂation, has proven not to be robust to the inclusion
of a second distortion, sticky prices, as Siu (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004) have recently pointed out. Sticky prices cause there to be a distribution
of prices in the economy and standard models imply that actual output is some
way below potential output. That distortion is so costly in terms of utility that
policymakers have an incentive to stabilise the price-level. This shifts much of
the remaining role for policy back onto ﬁscal policy; tax rates may again become
more volatile.
In the next section we develop a sticky-price general equilibrium model with
endogenous capital accumulation, incomplete ﬁnancial markets for government
debt, but with a number of diﬀerent tax rates upon which the government may
4draw to fund unavoidable expenditure. In the appendix we spell out the full
Ramsey problem. However, in the main body of the text we try to keep the
discussion as intuitive as possible. Hence, most of our time will be spent discussing
the key distortions in our model economy that optimising policies ought to address.
We provide a complete analytical solution to the model’s endogenous variables in
steady state and demonstrate that taxes and monopolistic ‘wedges’ are the only
remaining distortions. However, in the short-run sticky prices are important. We
demonstrate this by calculating the dynamic ineﬃciencies that result from sticky
prices interacting with the other distortionary elements in the model economy;
we label these ‘dynamic wedges’. We try to tease out some implications for the
optimal conduct of monetary policy from these dynamic wedges of ineﬃciency.
3. The Model
There are a large number of identical agents in the economy who evaluate their






Et denotes the expectations operator at time t, β is the discount factor, C is
consumption, M is the nominal money stock, P is the price-level and N(i) is the
quantity of labour supplied to industry i. Labour is industry speciﬁc. For the
moment we think of U(·) simply as being concave in its arguments and at least
twice diﬀerentiable. Consumption is deﬁned over a basket of goods of measure































t denotes aggregate demand.
They also face a ﬂow budget constraint,
Z 1
0








+ Pt(1 − τ
k
t)(ρt − δ)Kt + Wt(i)Nt(i)(1 − τ
h
t)+Πt.
As all agents are identical, the only ﬁnancial assets traded in equilibrium will
be those issued by the ﬁscal authority. Here Bt denotes the nominal value of
government bond holdings at the end of date t, 1+it denotes the nominal interest
rate on this riskless one-period nominal asset, Kt is the capital stock in period
t, ρt is the rental rate for capital and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Wt
denotes the nominal wage in period t,a n dΠt is proﬁts remitted to the individual.
We assume the returns on savings are taxed at rate τk, while labour income is
taxed at rate τh.











































Equation (3.5) denotes the real marginal utility of income. Equation (3.6) yields
the supply of labour given the (post-tax) real wage, wt. (3.7) is the money
demand equation, and (3.8) indicates the growth in consumption over time; the
consumption Euler equation. Optimal capital accumulation is described by (3.9)
and (3.10),












Ψt − βEtΨt+1(1 − δ). (3.10)
Equation (3.9) recognizes the utility foregone from investment at date t. (3.10)
captures the dynamic properties of this trade-oﬀ, such that higher capital next
period, ceteris paribus, enables higher consumption next period. The combination






























We will assume that the individual’s utility function is separable and isoelastic
U(C,M/P,N(i)=u(C;ξ)+w(M/P;ξ) − υ(N(i);ξ).
7ξ indicates a vector of exogenous shocks. We will also make the following
assumptions about the functional form of the utility function:













where v,λm > 0.
3.1. Representative ﬁrm: factor demands
Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce their distinctive goods according
to the following constant returns technology:
Yt(i)=F (Kt(i),A tNt(i)) ≡ [AtNt(i)]
φ Kt(i)
1−φ. (3.16)
Kt(i) is the real capital stock of the ﬁrm in period t,a n dAt is a stochastic
productivity shock which ﬂuctuates around a deterministic trend growth rate
which at time t is denoted by γt. The capital stock is not ﬁrm speciﬁcb u ti sh i r e d
on a period by period basis from agents in the economy. As a result, all ﬁrms
face the same cost of capital. However, labour is industry speciﬁc and equilibrium
wages depend on relative prices. Therefore marginal costs and capital-labour
ratios vary across ﬁrms.
As we shall see, there are some rigidities in the setting of prices, but whether
or not ﬁrms can change prices in a particular period they will meet demand at the
posted price. They will aim to meet that demand with the least cost combination
of factor inputs. ρt denotes the economy-wide rental rate for capital and wt(i)




































3.2. Representative industry: equilibrium wage and marginal cost
We are now able to solve for the equilibrium wage in a representative industry.
We equate labour demand and supply and using our expression for the demand
















































These are useful formulations as they relate our variables of interest, here wages
and marginal cost, to aggregate or economy-wide variables and terms in what we
may usefully think of as price dispersion. We shall return to this below.
3.3. Representative ﬁrm: price setting
Price dispersion will be crucial to the aggregate dynamic outcomes of our model
economy. And although in any particular industry marginal cost is constant across
9ﬁrms facing low demand or high demand states of the world, at the economy-wide
level the capital stock is given and short-run variations in output will be closely
correlated, ceteris paribus, with labour supply and the equilibrium real wage. We
adopt Yun’s (1996) variant of the Calvo (1983) set-up. Each period ﬁrms adjust
their prices for steady state inﬂation. In addition, a measure, 1 − α,o fﬁrms
are allowed to adjust prices in a more sophisticated way. Those ﬁrms choose the
nominal price which maximises their expected proﬁts given that they may have to
charge the same price, adjusted for inﬂation, in k−periods time with probability
αk.
In (3.20) we see that equilibrium wages are a function of a price dispersion
term. However, we are assuming that ﬁrms are cost-takers and that they do not
anticipate the change in wages in reaction to their price setting decision. The




































































































Any producer in industry i given the chance to reprice will chose the price, p0
t(i).












t is the average of new prices set in period t.
3.4. Fiscal Authorities
The government purchases goods and raises revenue through taxes on capital
and labour income and from seigniorage. We assume that the government can
borrow by issuing a one period risk-free nominal bond. Later on, when we come
to characterise the Ramsey policies in steady state it will be interesting to assume
some ability to levy lump-sum taxation, but we leave that issue aside for the








)Bt−1 − St − (Mt − Mt−1) (3.26)
where Bt denotes the end of period liabilities of the government, it is the one-







t(ρt − δ)Pt(i)Kt(i) − GtPt,
where Gt denotes real government expenditure. We rule out equilibria related
to the ﬁscal theory of the price level by requiring that the expected path of
11government surpluses must satisfy an intertemporal solvency condition, by design,














































The present value budget constraint demonstrates one fundamental way that
monetary and ﬁscal policy are linked; to the extent that (real) monetary growth
is higher, taxes may be lower. However, in most advanced economies seigniorage
is a relatively minor revenue source for government1. That said, once we shift our
focus from monetary policy qua monetary growth, to an interest rate path there
are important issues to be faced, and there may, in a certain sense, be constraints
on the feasible level of the nominal interest rate (See Chadha and Nolan, 2004b).
Finally, there is an economy-wide resource constraint such that total output
is equal to the sum of (private plus government) consumption and investment,
Yt = Ct + Gt + It. (3.28)
4. Characterising the steady-state
In this section we characterise fully the steady state of the model and examine
which distortions exist in steady state. First, we make our economy stationary
1More fundamentally, it may play no role in an optimal funding strategy for unavoidable
government spending for the reasons we brieﬂy surveyed at the beginning of this paper. See our
results below regarding the optimality of the Friedman Rule.
12by stripping out the eﬀects of trend nominal growth and productivity growth.
We assume that productivity grows at a constant rate γ, At = Aγt. We also
assume that government expenditure is a ﬁx e dp r o p o r t i o no fo u t p u t . A ss h o w n
in King, Plosser and Rebelo (2002) the form of household utility we have adopted
implies that real consumption, investment, capital stock, output and government
expenditure grow at the same rate: Ct = Cγt,I t = Iγt,K t = Kγt,Y t = Yγ t,G t =
Gγt. Labour supply will be constant in steady state, Nt = N, which implies that
the real wage grows with productivity, wt = wγt. Furthermore, we assume that
the tax code remains unchanged in steady state. Inﬂation is constant in steady
state and Ps+1 = πsP. With our assumptions the Euler equation (3.8) solves for














The latter implies that Ms+1 = Mωs, where ω = γπ. All nominal variables,
including debt, B, and the budget surplus, S, will grow at the same rate as
nominal money. In steady state, marginal cost and the return on capital will be
constant.
Equation (3.5) implies that µt should grow with the inverse of nominal
money µs+1 = 1
ωµs, while the Lagrange multiplier Ψs grows at the same rate as
µsPs;Ψs+1 = 1
γΨs , which is implied by equation (3.9). We adopt the convenient
normalizations that, in steady state, A =1 ,P=1 .
134.0.1. Evolution of Capital












In addition, we note that in a stationary steady state of our model we have that:
γK =( 1− δ)K + I ⇒
I
K
= δ + γ − 1. (4.2)
4.0.2. Price setting
From (3.25) we can conclude that all ﬁrms will set the same price in steady state,
p/P =1(the steady-state Phillips curve is vertical). As a consequence, a steady
state relation between output and consumption may be derived as follows. Recall











Combine this expression with equations (3.21) to (3.24) and note that in steady

















This expression will be useful below when we come to calculate closed-form
expressions for wages, output and consumption.
144.0.3. Steady state wage
























4.0.4. Steady state marginal cost












which is smaller than unity due to market power.
4.0.5. Solvency constraint







)Bt − St+1 − (Mt+1 − Mt). (4.8)
Nominal debt grows at the same rate as money, so it follows from (3.26) that the








where B is detrended nominal debt, M is detrended nominal money, and S is the
detrended primary surplus. This equation simply says that the primary surplus
has to be suﬃcient to roll over the debt stock, although a higher level of seigniorage
will reduce the need for factor taxation (for given G).
154.0.6. Budget surplus
We may calculate the steady state debt to GDP ratio in the following way. Note
that we may write the surplus as

















However, using our expression for the steady-state surplus and noticing that





















Using the money demand equation, equilibrium money M can the be expressed











C =( Ωsy − g)Y. (4.11)
Relation (4.11) deﬁnes the closed-form for the steady state level of the ratio of
debt to GDP, once we have expressions for output and consumption.
4.0.7. Output, consumption, capital and labour
Using the economy-wide resource constraint, the capital accumulation equation
(4.2) and the demand for capital (3.18) we ﬁnd that
ΩcgyY = C, (4.12)
16where Ωcgy =1−(δ + γ − 1) θ−1
θ
1−φ
ρ −g. Combining (4.12) and (4.4) allows us to









































































5. The steady state wedges
In our model economy there are three basic distortions (apart from the cost of
h o l d i n gm o n e y ) .F i r s t ,p r o d u c e r sh a v em o n o p o l i s t i cp o w e r .S e c o n d ,t h e r ei s( ﬂat-
rate) taxation of factor income. Third, there are nominal rigidities in the pricing
of ﬁnal output. The ﬁrst two distortions are present not only on the dynamic
path of the economy through time, but also in steady state. The ﬁnal distortion
is present only in the dynamics. We focus here on the steady-state distortions to
labour supply and savings. We then go on to look at the impact of sticky prices
o nt h ed y n a m i c so ft h ee c o n o m y .
5.1. The steady state labour wedge
The steady state labour wedge is the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure to the marginal product of labour. It is derived
17using (3.5) and (3.6), from the representative agent’s optimality conditions.
Formally the wedge is deﬁned by (5.1):









We recall the labour supply equation (3.6) and apply the deﬁnition of the wedge
using our particular production function:














h¢ θ − 1
θ
.
In an economy where the labour supply decision is not distorted the wedge will
equal unity. This would be the case if there were no labour taxes (τh =0 )
and consumption goods were perfect substitutes (θ →∞ ). The deviation of the
wedge from unity is a measure of economic ineﬃciency. When taxes are positive,
the labour wedge is always smaller than unity; therefore an increase in the wedge
corresponds to greater eﬃciency. The labour wedge grows with competition and
declines with tax. In the case of perfect competition it is clear that the eﬃcient
labour tax rate is zero. When competition is not perfect the government should
subsidise labour (τh < 0) in steady state. This seems clear enough from the
expression above. However, we demonstrate that result formally in the appendix.
It is an analagous result to that of Judd (2002) for the case of capital taxation
(see below).
5.2. The steady state investment wedge
For the case of savings and investment, we can examine prices and quantities to
see how our model economy deviates from an eﬃcient outcome. First, we look
at the behaviour of the rental rate on capital as that makes clear the eﬀect of
taxation. Then we examine quantities, the ratio of capital to labour will reﬂect
the monopolistic structure of the ﬁnal goods producers. Let us use the following






∂ [F(Ki,N i)+Ki(1 − δ)]
∂Ki
di (5.2)
The investment wedge can be thought of as the ratio between the marginal
gain to consumers from savings and the marginal return of the real sector from
investment. In the nondistorted steady state it should be equal to unity, which
we can demonstrate using the Euler equations for savings, investment, (3.11), and
the fact that in the non-distorted economy
∂F(Ki,Ni)




− (1 − δ).



















ρ is the return on capital in a distorted steady state, ρ =
γ−β
β(1−τk
t ) + δ, and this
clearly increases as the capital tax rate rises away from zero. When this tax is
positive
ρ
mc > e ρ, and the investment wedge is smaller than unity. Therefore, an
increase in the investment wedge implies higher eﬃciency.
The investment wedge is falling in the market power of ﬁrms 1
mc a n di nt a x e s ;
in other words, the ‘distance’ between the eﬃcient economy and the distorted
economy increases as taxes rise and as the extent of monopoly power increases.




γ does not depend on the capital tax rate.
However, the capital tax rate makes ﬁrms worse oﬀ due to the increasing cost of




19To see the impact of deviations from perfect competition we note that the steady-















The distortion to the capital-labour ratio, consequent on the monopolistic power
of ﬁnal producers, distorts investment behaviour in addition to taxation.
In the appendix we solve for the full dynamic Ramsey plan focussing, in
particular, on the steady state. Here we provide a brief intuitive discussion of
our results. First, we note that if we have access to lump sum taxation, then
steady state capital taxation may be negative, as Judd (2002) found. However,
we also ﬁn dt h a tl a b o u rt a x e si ns t e a d ys t a t ea r ea l s ol i a b l et ob en e g a t i v ei nt h a t
case. The reason for this is that the Ramsey planner is attempting to correct the
distortions in the economy and a key distortion is that output in this economy
is too low as a result of the monopoly distortion. Access to lump sum taxation
thus frees the ﬁscal authorities to address that distortion using the other taxation
levers. Of course, in the absence of such ﬁscal ﬂexibility these results will not go
through. This result is also sensitive to issues such as the extent of depreciation
allowances. Before a clear conclusion emerges on optimal steady state taxes,
further investigation is clearly needed.
Finally, we note that the Friedman rule is optimal, and a policy of mild
deﬂation is prescribed (again, we prove this in the appendix). However, that
conclusion may be tenuous in the sense that it relies, in part, on the assumption
that all prices are equal in steady state. If there remained a distribution of prices,
2Of course ρ in this expression will also reﬂect the impact of taxation. However, if taxation
were zero or even negative, such that the rate of return was at its undistorted level, then the
impact of imperfect competition would still be present. The fact, however, that capital taxtation
need not be zero in steady state, and may optimally be positive, serves to underline something
that we emphasise later, namely that the distortions in the economy will interact in ways that
will often reinforce one another.
20then a policy of mild inﬂation may yield output gains (as in Nicolae and Nolan,
forthcoming) that would have to be balanced against the costs of holding money
balances.
6. Price rigidity and the dynamic wedges
For the formulation of rules governing the conduct of aggregate monetary and ﬁscal
policies in response to shocks, be they one-oﬀ or of a more systematic nature (as
in the demand and supply shocks that are thought to drive ﬂuctuations in activity
at the business cycle frequencies), we need to understand how these wedges evolve
through time. The Ramsey problem set out in the appendix helps us address these
issues also, in principle at least. However, the Ramsey solution can be diﬃcult
to characterise analytically. So in this section we focus on a more limited set of
issues: Is monetary policy still likely optimally to be directed at price stability
in the model we have developed? To cast some light on that issue, therefore, we
derive expressions for the aggregate wedges as they evolve through time; what we
might label ‘dynamic wedges’. It becomes apparent that the distortions underlying
these wedges interact in a potentially reinforcing way. For example, we shall see
that price instability interacts with the tax on labour in a way that increases
that distortion and pushes our model economy further from the eﬃcient outcome.
In constructing these dynamic wedges we ﬁnd it useful to derive a measure of
aggregate (or average) economy-wide marginal cost (which is proportional to the
economy-wide capital stock and labour input). This is a little time consuming
and so most of the calculations are relegated to an appendix. However, to give a
ﬂavour of the nature of the aggregation issues we face we outline the calculation
























































































The ﬁr s tl i n eo ft h i se x p r e s s i o nu s e s( 3 . 1 8 ) ,w h i l et h es e c o n dl i n ei n c o r p o r a t e s
t h eD i x i t - S t i g l i t zd e m a n df u n c t i o n . T h et h i r dl i n ei n c o r p o r a t e s( 3 . 2 0 )a n dt h e
fourth line simply gathers terms. We see immediately that if prices were equal
the price dispersion term would equal unity and we would have an expression for
the natural level of capital3.
6.1. The dynamic labour wedge
As we noted, the steady state labour wedge is deﬁned as the ratio of the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product
3In that case, however, consumption, output and the return on capital would also be at their
natural levels. Our point is simply that, absent the price dispersion term, the expression in the
text for the aggregate stock has the same functional form as an economy with no price rigidity.

























































, and we assume that our
parameters are chosen in such way that inequality (6.4) holds, which is true when




+ θ − 1=
θ(1 + v − 2vφ)+1+v(1 − φ)
1+v(1 − φ)
> 0. (6.4)






















This wedge is clearly likely to be time-varying, but is it dynamic? The answer
is: Yes. As we argue below, the variance term is a function of expected future
inﬂation. That is because price setters take into account future variables when
they set prices. We see that when labour taxes are set to zero and price dispersion
is also zero, then the wedge is simply equal to our measure of average marginal
cost, mc∗
t. However when both labour taxes are non-zero and the distribution
of prices is non-degenerate, the ‘distance’ between our model economy and the
23eﬃcient level of activity (i.e., the outcome of a perfectly competitive, ﬂexible-price
economy with no distortionary taxation) opens up. Moreover, the tax distortion
and the price distortion clearly interact; a given wedge associated with some tax
rate may be exacerbated by a degree of price dispersion, in the event that other
instruments are unavailable to smooth the excess burden of taxation (such as
state-contingent debt).
6.2. The dynamic investment wedge
Following a similar approach as for labour, we may write the dynamic aggregate
wedge for savings/investment as






















































t is the level of capital that would be employed should all





















. Finally, we may write the
investment wedge as







































24It is straightforward to show that
∂ϑk(θ)
∂θ < 0 which, ceteris paribus, implies that
the investment wedge increases with the degree of competition (i.e., moves us
closer to the eﬃcient outcome). However, the degree of competition also impacts
on marginal cost, as we saw when we calculated the steady state wedge where
it showed up the marginal cost term. The overall impact on the wedge from
competition is beneﬁcial. On the other hand, an increase in the rate of capital
taxation reduces investment and, other things constant, increases the return on
capital, ∂ρt/∂τk
t > 0; the investment wedge is therefore declining in the capital
tax. And as we found before, the level of distortion may be increasing in the
degree of price dispersion in the economy. However, future expected inﬂation and
taxation are also now important. For example, ceteris paribus, a rise in expected
inﬂation will decrease the size of the investment wedge (moving it farther from
the eﬃc i e n to u t c o m e ) . T h ed o m i n a n tc h a n n e la p p e a r st ob et h a th i g h e rf u t u r e
inﬂation brings forward consumption lowering current savings. In addition, higher
expected inﬂation will also widen current period price dispersion as producers who
get a chance to change prices this period internalize that into current period pricing
decisions. This anticipation of future events also impacts on the labour market
wedge, making that wedge, in eﬀect, also ‘forward-looking’. In Damjanovic and
Nolan (2005b) we investigate that particular eﬀect in a simpler set-up where we
can quantify the impact of inﬂation on taxes for a given a level of government
expenditure. We also look at recent OECD data on the relationship between
inﬂation and taxes.
We may glean a number of things from the analysis of these dynamic wedges.
First, the addition of capital into this model is unlikely to overturn the broad
case for price stability.4 As we mentioned earlier, when prices are sticky, there
4We are deliberately leaving to one side the Friedman Rule. In calibrated models with more
complex features, its prescription of deﬂation is often overturned. Alternatively, one may want
to think of a cashless economy in which case it is redundant, and the dynamic wedges we are
25is a costly misallocation of resources in the economy. The temptation to exploit
inﬂation to emulate state-contingent government pay-outs (and hence smooth the
excess burden of taxation) needs to be tempered by the realisation that such a
policy will widen the dispersion of prices and move, ceteris paribus, the economy
further from the eﬃc i e n to u t c o m e . I no u rm o d e ls u c hap o l i c yw i l li ng e n e r a l
result in further distortions to the labour supply and investment decisions. An
intertemporal dimension is particularly important in the case of the investment
wedge. Any attempt to use surprise inﬂa t i o ni nt h i se c o n o m yt oi n ﬂate away
government debt is liable not only to increase current price dispersion but may
also increase future expected inﬂation. In addition, a policy of systematically
exploiting inﬂation in this way can interact with taxes further worsening the
situation. Second, even when volatility in capital taxes is, other things constant,
a desirable policy (as it may be, given that capital is a state variable and in
inelastic supply from the date t perspective), a policy of inﬂation cannot help us
smooth one distortion through time in this economy without having an impact
on other distortions. In other words, inﬂation cannot easily be used to massage
one distortion without having likely adverse implications for the other distortions.
Finally, we note that the distortions captured in our dynamic wedges can be shown
to imply that above some critical value for inﬂation, further inﬂation unambigously
increases the distance between the distorted economy and the eﬃcient outturn.
This is a somewhat subtle issue which we explore further in Damjanovic and Nolan
(2005a).
considering are the key distortions. Finally, in practice deﬂation rarely seems to appeal to central
bankers as a part of an optimal monetary policy.
267. Conclusions and directions for future research
In this paper we have reviewed some aspects of the literature on optimal monetary
and ﬁscal policy. We have extended this discussion into an environment where
price are sticky and capital is endogenous. We clariﬁed the distortions that existed
in that model economy, both in steady state and dynamically. We concluded
that when government debt is not state-contingent and prices are sticky then
an eﬃcient monetary policy is unlikely to seek to use inﬂation to ameliorate the
remaining distortions in the economy. Incorporating capital into this picture, we
conjectured, seems to bolster further the case for price stability.
There are a number of avenues of investigation that need to be pursued. The
arguments in this paper, with respect to the dynamic properties of monetary
policy, were somewhat loose and intuitive. A more formal characterization of
the dynamic Ramsey programme for both aggregate monetary and ﬁscal policy is
required, incorporating a richer array of ﬁscal instruments than is present hitherto
in the literature. That work is in progress (Damjanovic and Nolan, 2005a,b).
Second, the (largely separate) literatures on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy
have found many additional distortions to be empirically important. For example,
in the monetary literature sticky wages, habits in consumption, rule of thumb
behaviour, learning, to name but a few, have been mentioned by a number of
economists as important components of realistic macroeconomic models. The
ﬁscal literature has also noted the importance of some factors: The nature of
government spending (on ﬁnal consumption or for employment purposes), the
degree of monopoly power, the size of depreciation allowance, the potential
importance of the automatic stabilisers, have all been highlighted. Understanding
how these factors interact and inﬂuence (jointly) optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policies is likely to yield important insights.
27Finally, an important avenue for investigation would seem to be the
incorporation of non-Ricardian elements into the model. Again, this seems
empirically realistic, although it may complicate considerably the characterization
of the Ramsey plans.
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318. Appendix
8.1. The Ramsey problem
In this appendix we set out the Ramsey problem. Our principal aim is
methodological; we want to set out the key steps in characterising the Ramsey
plan. We then emphasise some central steady state results. We do not pursue to
any extent the characterisation of the fully dynamic Ramsey plan (see Damjanovic
and Nolan (2005a) for further analysis).















































We need to maximize utility subject to the agent’s budget constraint, market
clearing conditions and the agent’s Euler equations.





































32This expression corresponds to the private agent’s analogue to (3.27) in the main




t = Ct + Gt + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt,




















(1 − ∆t+k h−Λ50i)+λm.










Equation (3.25) provides us with the law of motion for inﬂation and may usefully
be rewritten as















We also make the standard assumption that the nominal interest rate is positive
i
k
t > 0. (8.4)






























































































We seek the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions with respect to C,K,N,ik, the
variables which determine steady state policy. We give each of these in turn:



















































































+ d5t+k =0 (8.8)
Equation (8.8) implies that d5t+k > 0 and inequality (8.4) is binding. It follows
that the optimal interest rate is zero ik
t+1 =0 . Hence, as claimed in the main text,
the Friedman rule in our model economy is optimal, both in and out of steady
state.
We turn to the steady state implications of this system of dynamic equations.




(1 − mc); (8.9)

























































+ d2C =0 ; (8.11)




d3t+k = d3,d 4t+k = d4.We also deﬁne ˜ ρ =
γ
β − (1 − δ) which equals the capital
return in steady state with zero capital tax.
When the economy is perfectly competitive, mc =1 , and equation (8.10)
implies ρ =˜ ρ, which corresponds to the optimality of the zero capital tax rate, as
found by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986).
8.2. When lump sum taxation is allowed
In the ﬁrst-best situation, where government is allow to use a lump-sum tax /
subsidy, to ﬁnd an optimal tax policy we do not need to take into account the
35solvency constraint. In this case d1 =0 ,C d 2 =( 1+λm). Equation (8.10) solves
for the optimal capital return
ρ =˜ ρmc,












k =( mc − 1)
(γ − β + δβ)
mc(γ − β + δβ) − δβ
.
The optimal capital tax rate τk is negative, and grows in the degree of
competitiveness. For a perfectly competitive market structure mc =1and τk
is zero. This result appears similar to that of Guo and Lansing (1999).




We recall that Nv+1C
φY = wN







Optimal τh is also negative. The government should pay higher subsidies to labour
when the economy is less competitive and the larger is λm.
368.3. Aggregate relations
8.3.1. Aggregating capital






















































































We introduce the following notation: K∗
t is the level of capital should all ﬁrms






































































































t in a manner analogous to K∗
t and similarly N∗
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